Russia’s Futures, from Fairy Tales and Editorials to Kremlin Narratives: Prokhanov, Dugin, Surkov by Mondry, Henrietta & Pavlov, Evgeny
New Zealand Slavonic Journal, vol. 53-54 (2019-2020) 
Henrietta Mondry and Evgeny Pavlov 
RUSSIA’S FUTURES, FROM FAIRY TALES AND EDITORIALS 
TO KREMLIN NARRATIVES: PROKHANOV, DUGIN, SURKOV 
Abstract 
The article examines narratives of Russia’s geopolitical future that originate in Neo-
Eurasianist ideology. These narratives, rooted in the pre-war Russian émigré school of 
historiography, identify Russia’s special civilisational destiny as a land-based power that 
makes it distinct from Western sea powers. These narratives have circulated among 
Russia’s right-wing intelligentsia since the late 1980s and have recently become 
mainstream. Their partial adoption by the Kremlin ideologists demonstrates their 
exceptional staying power and also raises questions about how the Russian ruling elite 
sees the future. The case studies selected here include the writings of the veteran author 
Aleksandr Prokhanov, influential theorist Aleksandr Dugin, and the Kremlin 
advisor Vladislav Surkov. We argue that while Prokhanov’s and Dugin’s visions are 
based on eschatological notions rooted in the Russia’s pre-Petrine past and in folklore. 
Surkov’s programmatic article that takes some of the same notions as its point of 
departure is nonetheless a poor attempt at imagining a future as an indefinitely 
suspended present of the Putin regime. 
Keywords: Prokhanov, Aleksandr; Dugin, Aleksandr; Surkov, Vladislav; Neo-
Eurasianism; newspaper editorials; time in political narratives.  
Мы рождены, чтоб сказку сделать былью 
[We are born to make fairy tales come true] 
The Song of Soviet Aviators, 1923. 
Ever since the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Putin’s 
ideologists and propagandists have been busy devising narratives of the 
“Russian world” “getting up from its knees” and correcting an “outrageous 
historical injustice” imposed upon Russians outside the Russian Federation 
by the Western powers intent on weakening their defeated Cold War foe. 
Thus, given Russia’s resolute choice not to abandon its people outside its 
borders, residents of Crimea “were able to peacefully express their free will 
regarding their own future” (Putin 2014), while the residents of Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions had to resort to armed insurrection and war in order to 
defend the future of their language and culture on their own land. These 
narratives are all too familiar to the viewers of Russia’s state-controlled TV 
channels and other media outlets that have been exploiting them for the last 
seven years. More recently, following Putin’s increasingly draconian 
political measures, including the decision to change the Constitution and 
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have the two-term limit on power it stipulates “zero out” for himself, one 
wonders what sort of future he envisions for his country and, no less 
importantly, how this future is legitimised. Already in his speech on the 
annexation of Crimea, he resorted to various historical narratives and myths 
through which the future of the peninsula was framed and, in a sense 
prefigured: the original unity of the three East Slavonic nations, the baptism 
of Prince Vladimir in Chersonesos, the glorious imperial and Soviet military 
history in which Crimea played an important part as a stronghold common 
to a whole number of nations united under Russia’s fold. In thinking about 
the future, Putin’s speech writers and advisors draw their inspiration from a 
range of sources in all of which the vision of the present and the future is 
prefigured and predetermined. This vision is always ultra-conservative, most 
often religious, ultra-nationalist, utopian, at times racist, and on occasion 
downright bizarre. In what follows we would like to examine a particular 
futuristic narrative line that is firmly rooted in Neo-Eurasianist fantasies and, 
in part, in Russian fairy tales. We find traces of the same type of thinking in 
the rambling, baroque editorials regularly penned by the veteran author 
Aleksandr Prokhanov, militant scholarly and journalistic texts of the ultra-
right philosopher Aleksandr Dugin, and a recent programmatic article of the 
Kremlin’s long-term ideologist Vladislav Surkov. We argue that although 
the three approaches to futurity share some of the same ideological basis, 
they demonstrate a clear difference when it comes to the future. Where 
Prokhanov envisions the past as prefiguring the future in dreams and fairy 
tales, Dugin sees the future as a deliberate return to a certain kind of past 
which to him is an expression of eternity, and Surkov expects the future to 
be nothing but an extension of the present.  
Prokhanov and his editorials: the evolution of the Soviet genre 
Among the Russian online newspapers, the weekly Zavtra.ru occupies 
a special position because, as its title [Tomorrow.ru] suggests, the 
newspaper’s identity is constructed around the notion of the future. The 
concept of futurity, which the newspaper develops and promotes, is a 
symbiosis of science and eschatology, technology and religious beliefs, all 
of which are given political dimensions. This combination makes the idea of 
achieving the ultimate futuristic dream of humanity - that of immortality - 
possible, providing there is state leadership which directs the nation along 
the right path. Historically, from the year of its conception in 1993, this 
newspaper has been a platform for strong nationalistic and patriotic views.1  
1 The newspaper is available online and in hard copies, its declared circulation is 
100.000 copies.   
RUSSIA’S FUTURES: PROKHANOV, DUGIN, SURKOV  203 
It promotes the geopolitical views of popular Neo-Eurasianist ideology 
which groups or juxtaposes civilisations in terms of their alleged 
in/compatible worldviews based on historically divergent or similar pasts. 
As a platform concerned with futurity, the newspaper often generates visions 
and scenarios for the future which are linked with utopian narratives and, in 
some cases, fairy tale motifs. In the case of the specific futurity of Zavtra.ru 
the development of this vision is steered mainly through the editorials of by 
its editor-in-chief, Aleksandr Prokhanov (b. 1938), a veteran journalist and 
essayist with the career spanning from the late Soviet era to the present. An 
important public personality, Prokhanov’s political vision is based on 
drawing a line of continuity between pre-modern Russia, the Russian 
Empire, the Soviet Union and contemporary Russia. He terms this alleged 
overarching line of permanence “the Empire” and dubs the current juncture 
in time/space as the stage before the final “Fifth Empire”, and presents his 
vision of Russian religious-technocratic messianism. Focusing on the 
culture-specific genre of editorials, we demonstrate that the editorials in 
Zavtra.ru are the laboratory of creation of a specific brand of futurity, which 
is proleptic in its incorporation of the past into a vision of the desired future. 
We argue that this futurity is simultaneously forward looking and 
conservative because it glorifies the events of the past on the basis of their 
futuristic potential which could not be fully realised earlier. The ability to 
dream as well as the subject matter of dreams become a category for 
evaluation of the past, present and future of the national states and their 
people. Moreover, the will and ability to turn dreams into reality are 
presented as unique characteristics of the Russian people and their leaders.  
The style and rhetoric of Prokhanov’s editorials are strongly grounded 
in the form of this genre as it was defined and practised in the Soviet Union. 
Peredovitsa or peredovaia stat’ia is a front-page newspaper article which 
was one of the important means of propaganda in the USSR. In the 1970s, 
peredovitsa was charged with “informing and influencing the wider 
readership.” According to the definition of the style of peredovitsa in the 
1973 textbook The Language and Style of the Editorial Article (“Язык и 
стиль передовой статьи”), editorials are texts which are used for 
expressions of subjective and emotive views with the aim of influencing 
political opinions of a wide collective of readers: 
In the editorial articles the factors of subjective evaluation have the 
decisive influence in the usage of language resources which solve 
communicative tasks of persuasion, giving directives and aiding the 
critical evaluation of unfolding events. The language of the editorial 
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expresses the subjective aspirations of the authors to influence the 
political and ideological views of the wider readership. Language 
forms here acquire deeply expressive character […].  (Solgalnik 1973 
58) 
Moreover, according to the tenets of the newspaper style and structure, there 
should be a sharp distinction between a dry and informative style of the rest 
of the newspaper and the emotive style of the editorial:  
Study of newspaper narratives shows that there is a clear difference 
between informative articles and editorials. The first kind use 
documentary style conveying information. The second kind have an 
overtly evaluative polemical character and have the effect of agitation, 
in many parameters coming close to the language of fiction.  (ibid.) 
Starting from the Perestroika period of the late 1980s, the Russian 
language of mass media has developed significantly and became enriched 
with religious vocabulary and homiletic rhetoric, identified by scholars as 
“religiozno-propovednicheskii stil’” – “religious homiletic style” 
(Gosteeva).  This style, in turn, borrows its vocabulary and rhetoric from 
literary and ceremonial genres, intersecting them with long-form journalist 
writing (publitsistika).  The new style partially overlaps with the style of 
Soviet editorials which synthesised various genres and allowed an 
expression of authorial subjectivity. What was a set of characteristic features 
of Soviet editorials becomes a feature of contemporary publitsistika with its 
emphasis on emotive expressivity which has to have an appeal to the large 
collective of the speakers of the Russian language (Solgalnik 2006). Of 
special relevance to Aleksandr Prokhanov’s editorials in Zavtra.ru is the 
notion of the symbiotic style of the narrative, which brings together elements 
of essayistic writing, reportage and fiction. Moreover, Prokhanov also 
incorporates and even develops a religious-homiletic style by introducing not 
only religious themes but also by using the rhetoric of religious sermons. 
Notably, Prokhanov is not only an essayist but also an author of award-
winning novels with phantasmagorical conspiracist plots, most of which 
promote Neo-Eurasianist ideology (Livers 2010, 2020).2 His experience in a 
wide range of writing makes him a competent author of the culture-specific 
genre of newspaper editorials.     
2 His 2002 novel Mr. Hexogen (Gospodin Geksogen) won that year’s National Best 
Seller competition. He also won the prestigious literary Bunin Prize in 2009, the aim of 
which is “to revive the best traditions of Russian national literature”. In “Obladatelem 
Buninskoi premii stal Aleksandr Prokhanov”. Kommersant. 23. 10. 2009. 12. 
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Narratives of eternity and continuity in history 
  
In his editorial “The Fifth Stalin” (“Piatyi Stalin”) (19. 12. 2018) 
Prokhanov formulates the idea of a homogenous cultural continuity in Russia 
(Prokhanov 2018).  He explains this continuity by the idea of common 
aspirations for the implementation of dreams into reality. To develop the 
concept of such unifying continuity he creates the notion “Stil’ Stalin”, 
“Stalin Style” which he uses proleptically and transhistorically, but, 
importantly, not transnationally. According to him, this Style already existed 
in Kievan Rus which united disparate peoples into a cohesive nationality and 
made way for the building of an empire. The Stalin Style, Prokhanov 
maintains, achieved its high point during the time of real Stalin whose 
leadership helped Russia to realize its industrial, technological and military 
might. Of relevance is the fact that between 1930 and 1953 (the year of 
Stalin’s death) there indeed emerged style known as stalinskii ampir, 
Stalinist Empire style, which found its representation in architecture, 
sculpture and interior décor. Characterised by grandeur and pomposity, the 
style incorporated elements of Deco, Baroque and Napoleonic Empire but, 
notably, after Stalin’s death, this Stalinist Empire style was criticised for its 
excesses and extravagant spending.3  And while today the most iconic 
architectural monuments of this style adorn the cityscape of Moscow as well 
as its underground metro stations, they are artefacts of a particular epoch and 
particular ideology. Scholars of the semiotics of grand buildings and 
sculptures of the Stalin period note that these structures were erected as 
“intentional” monuments. They were meant to represent “ahistoricity”, and 
function “as some sort of utopian preserve of the future where time would 
not flow” (Yampolsky 98).  At the same time, as monuments, they also 
bridged the past with the future thus creating and reinforcing an idea of 
homogenous continuity in a given culture.   
 
Fittingly, in Prokhanov’s definition, the Stalin Style is transhistorical, 
encompassing past, present and future, and, for this reason, it is presented as 
a cultural phenomenon which emerged long before the historical Stalin. 
Prokhanov conceptualises this style as a specifically national phenomenon, 
which unifies national character with the uniquely specific style of 
leadership. This essentialised uniqueness, in turn, has strong messianic 
connotations. Notably, the alleged continuity in culture is interrupted only 
by the outside enemy. Historical Stalin, whom Prokhanov calls the fourth 
 
3 See a discussion on this in Day.  
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Stalin, is presented as the apogee of the so called “Russian time”: “Stalin is 
a splash of the Russian time from the peak of which eternity opens up” – 
“Сталин — это всплеск русского времени, с вершины которого видна 
бесконечность”.  
  
This chronotopic image creates an intersection between time and space, 
where the space is geopolitically bound to the Russian Empire’s territories 
while both time and space converge in eternity. The implication is that 
territorially the Russian Empire will not diminish and that those who live 
within its borders are guaranteed the kind of future which goes beyond the 
limits of earthly existence. This eternity is achieved by technological 
advances and hard work, which will make the return of Stalin himself – the 
Fifth Stalin - possible. The rhetoric and the imagery have distinct religious-
propagandistic overtones in line with the tenets of the Soviet editorials 
combined with the developments of the last decade of the Soviet Union.     
 
Addressing the issue of real physical immortality, Prokhanov 
characteristically enmeshes science, art and dreams in his formulation of 
Russian futurity, in which the resurrection of Stalin becomes a reality:   
 
Скульпторы и художники, стремящиеся поставить монумент 
Сталину, не спешите и дождитесь его нового появления. Пятый 
Сталин не будет отлит из бронзы, не будет высечен из гранита 
или мрамора. Пятый Сталин — это скорость света, это скорость 
русской истории, это русская мечта. Художник, ты можешь 
изобразить скорость света? Можешь изобразить русскую мечту? 
 
Sculptors and artists, who aim to put a monument to Stalin, do not rush 
but wait for his new appearance. The Fifth Stalin will not be cast in 
bronze, nor will he be cut out of granite or marble. The Fifth Stalin – 
is the speed of light, the speed of Russia’s history, it is Russian dream. 
Artist, can you represent the speed of light? Can you represent the 
Russian dream? 
 
Prokhanov’s vision of the future has broad appeal because it converges 
elements of religious and scientific utopianism. Notably, Prokhanov is a 
Fedorovian, and on many occasions he refers to Nikolai Fedorov’s The 
History of the Common Task (1903) as the source of his beliefs in the 
possibility to achieve the corporeal resurrection of generations of dead 
ancestors. Fedorov’s scientific utopian thinking had an unparalleled impact 
on both religious and atheistic futurity in Russia and the Soviet Union. It also 
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influenced the development of Soviet cosmism which was driven by 
Fedorov’s idea that new planetary spaces will be needed to accommodate the 
resurrected humans and a growing population of now immortal people 
(Young).  However, unlike Fedorov’s quest for a global and transnational 
collaboration in achieving this task of resurrecting the dead, Prokhanov’s 
cosmism is centred around the nation state and even alludes to the current 
race towards the colonisation of planetary spaces. It is, perhaps, for this latter 
reason that he equates Stalin and new Russian Empire of the future with the 
speed of light. 
 
In Prokhanov’s editorials the narrative of historical continuity in 
Russian missionary dreaming and the strength of the state inevitably has to 
include the country’s current leader, Vladimir Putin. In an article with an 
explicitly futuristic title, “Putin, a Russian Dreamer” (30.01.2019) “Путин - 
русский мечтатель”, Prokhanov further develops the topic of the Russian 
dream. In this article, his Fedorovian utopianism and cosmism become overt 
and enmeshed with folk dreams about a better future. Opening with the 
question “I would like to understand, what is our state-power, our multi-
ethnic Russian Dream?” Prokhanov proceeds by formulating the dream:   
 
Эту Мечту не угадаешь сразу. […] Её можно понять, если 
кропотливо исследовать весь путь нашей истории от древних 
времён до нынешних дней, если услышать, как высказывают эту 
Мечту самые прозорливые, самые просвещённые люди разных 
русских времён: её пророки, её ясновидцы, её великие, 
прозревающие будущее, политики и поэты.   
 
This Dream cannot be guessed quickly. […] It can be understood by 
scrupulously examining the whole path of our history from ancient 
times till recent days; it can be understood by hearing how this Dream 
is expressed by the most foreseeing and enlightened people of various 
times in Russian history: its prophets, its seers, its great future-seeing 
politicians and poets.  
 
Of note is Prokanov’s use of the words such as “prozrevat’” which he 
borrows from the religious vocabulary and uses in a new meaning. 
Prozrevat’ means to start seeing after being blind, which is an allusion to 
Christian Scriptures (John 9:25), while figuratively the verb means to foresee 
and predict. This lexical choice results in the image of Russian leaders as 
anointed by Providence in their historical mission, which includes the current 
activities of the president of Russia.     
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National dreams and fairy tale narratives  
 
In this editorial Prokhanov turns to dreams in their relation to various 
nationalities. He also uses fairy tale motifs as the foundation for what he 
conceptualizes as specific national dreams. His strategy is to show that 
dreams need to be turned into reality. Today, the dreams of the Russian 
nation as expressed in Russian fairy tales are realised by people toiling in 
science, industry and agriculture: “Русские сказки своим неповторимым 
языком поведали нам о нашей Мечте, которую сегодня мы продолжаем 
воплощать в наших лабораториях, на наших нивах, на наших хлебных 
полях”. (“Russian fairy tales revealed to us our Dream in their unique 
language, and today we continue to realise it in our laboratories, in our 
cornfields and farmlands.”) 
 
Turning to Russian fairy tales allows Prokhanov to create a narrative of 
Dreams which synthesises pre-Christian folk motifs with religious 
eschatology and scientific futurity. Importantly, Prokhanov uses fairy tales 
as an expression of a nation’s specificity. Dreams in his rendition become 
reflections of a nation’s mentality determined by its historical past. 
Importantly, he mentions dreams of other peoples of Russia and strategically 
confines his examples to the territorial borders of the Russian state. 
Describing his conversations with people of various ethnic groups during his 
travels through Russia, he focuses on the themes in the dreams of 
immortality and the good life on this earth. He then turns to defining various 
national dreams of the main powerful states globally, and his choice of the 
nations allows him to show contrasting dreams as well as different ways in 
which these dreams are implemented in reality. He first identifies and 
glorifies the Russian dream as well as the dreams of some ethnic groups of 
the Russian state, and then formulates his understanding of American and 
Chinese dreams. The choice of the United States and China is grounded in 
the geopolitical doctrines of Neo-Eurasianism. According to Neo-
Eurasianist views, the United States represents an Atlanticist civilisation, 
driven by mercantilism and expansionism. Countries of the Atlanticist 
groups represent civilization which is incompatible with the Eurasian 
mentality of continental peoples presented as deeply rooted in native soil. 
China also stands outside of the notion of “complimentary” nations of 
Eurasia.4  This is in line with the original Eurasian thinking of the 1920s 
 
4 The tenets of Neo-Eurasianism are essentialist and were developed by Lev Gumilev 
whose work came to prominence with the fall of the Soviet Union. Gumilev coined 
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defined by Nikolai Trubetskoi, who excluded “old Asiatic kingdoms” such 
as China from the Eurasian world. The reason for this exclusion was 
explained by the fact that China as an ancient civilisation was formed before 
Genghis Khan’s unification of the peoples of Eurasia under the “Pan-Asiatic 
imperialism” (Trubetzkoy 195). According to Trubetskoi, in its 
subordination to the Muscovite State, the Eurasian world “achieved for the 
first time a cultural self-sufficiency” (Trubetzkoy 197).  Contemporary Neo-
Eurasianist thinking valorises this idea of the homologous development and 
unity of the peoples of Eurasia.  
 
According to Prokhanov, dreams about futurity develop differently 
among different nations. In Russia, such dreams materialise in achievements 
in science which, importantly, in his rendition are presented as being in 
harmony with both the Russian Orthodox faith and pantheistic beliefs. 
Fittingly, Prokhanov’s choice of nationalities within Russia itself is selective 
and in line with the categories of Neo-Eurasianism. His description of 
conversations held with wisemen and sages during his travels mentions a 
carefully selected group of the peoples of Eurasia. The absence of some 
nationalities is particularly evident in his descriptions of travels in the 
Caucasus when he writes about the dreams of the Ossetians but excludes 
dreams of the Muslim minorities. Another illustration of strategic choice of 
ethnic groups is Prokhanov’s mention of the Mari people of the Volga region 
who traditionally practice animism. The choice of Mari fits current trends in 
the neo-pagan revival in Russia which accommodates ancestral cults of 
rodnoverie and serves the nationalist agenda (Laruelle).  Having paid tribute 
to the role of dreams expressed in fairy tales—such as the desire for 
abundance and eternal life—Prokhanov prepares the ground for the 
culmination of these dreams in the scientific futurity of the Fedorovian 
brand, which is materialised in the victories of space exploration:   
   
Русская Мечта — мечта космическая. Она несётся в мире с 
первой и второй космической скоростью, она несётся в мире со 
скоростью света. (Prokhanov 2019) 
 
The Russian dream is cosmic. It moves with the first and second 
cosmic velocity, it moves with the speed of light.  
 
His summary of the Russian Dream celebrates the role of the state and its 
leaders: 
 
concepts such as komplimentarnost’ and “ethogenesis” to argue that some ethnic groups 
(including Jews) are not compatible with the others. (Gumilev) 
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Так в чём же она, Русская Мечта? Это мечта о могучем и 
праведном Царстве, которое окружает и охраняет общество 
великой справедливости, любви и благодати, где в гармонию 
приведены силы природы и силы техники, силы отдельного 
человека и всемогущего государства. Где жизнь лесного цветка и 
жизнь мерцающей звезды небесной соединены общим 
ощущением мировой симфонии. Эта благодать добывается 
великими трудами, великими усилиями всего нашего 
российского общества, каждой российской земли, каждого 
проживающего на этих землях народа. (Ibid.) 
 
So what is the essence of the Russian Dream? It is a dream about a 
mighty and saintly Kingdom which defends the society of great 
justice, love and grace, where the forces of nature and powers of 
technologies harmoniously unite with the forces of the individual and 
the almighty state. It is the place where the life of a forest flower and 
a shining star in the sky are united by the collective sense of world 
harmony. This grace is achieved by great labour, great efforts of the 
whole of our Russian society, of every bit of the Russian soil and of 
every nationality that lives on this soil.  
 
While Prokhanov pays tribute to the nationalities of the Russian state, he 
nevertheless maintains that all dreams and hopes of these nationalities 
converge into a homogenous Russian dream.    
 
Having identified the Russian dream, Prokhanov defines “the American 
Dream”. While he pays tribute to the US’s achievements in science and 
technology, he denies the eschatological dimensions of the dream of the 
American people:  
 
Американская мечта — это “град на холме”, это крепость, 
построенная на горе, с которой видны все другие, лежащие в 
долинах, города и селения. И если в каком-то из этих селений 
возникает непорядок, американцы из своих бойниц посыпают 
долинные города и селения своими крылатыми ракетами. (Ibid.) 
 
The American dream is a city on a hill, it is a fortress from which all 
other cities and villages are observable. And if there is trouble in one 
of these places Americans start firing rockets from their arrowslits at 
these cities and villages. 
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Prokhanov not only promulgates the Soviet image of the United States as a 
country of aggressors, he specifically limits the so-called American dream to 
the defence of the existing order without wanting to change the present for a 
better future.   
 
His definition of “the Chinese Dream” similarly diminishes the role of 
futuristic visions and presents China as a civilisation of secular orientation:  
 
Китайская мечта, которая сопрягается с Великим Шёлковым 
путём, — это мечта о восстановлении китайского достоинства, 
того достоинства, которое на протяжении долгих лет попиралось 
то англичанами, то японцами, достоинства, которое было 
растоптано. И сегодня Китай, достигая великого возрождения, 
стремится утвердить своё существование в гармоничном и 
цветущем мире. (Ibid.) 
 
The Chinese dream is connected with the Silk Route. It is a dream of 
re-establishing Chinese dignity, the kind of dignity which for many 
years was insulted at times by the English, or by the Japanese, a kind 
of dignity which was trampled upon. Today China, reaching its great 
rebirth, aims to assert its existence in a harmonious and flowering 
world. 
 
What explicitly characterises and distinguishes these two national 
dreams from the Russian dream is their lack of daring eschatological 
aspirations. Both of these dreams, in Prokhanov’s construal, are concerned 
with this worldly life but lack the vision of immortality. Having described 
these alternative national dreams, Prokhanov’s editorial makes a rhetorical 
conclusion about the distinctive character of the Russian dream:   
 
Русская мечта — это храм на холме. Мы построили холм из 
наших верований, страданий, поражений, из великих побед и 
откровений. На вершине этого холма мы построили храм, 
который своими крестами касается небесной лазури, касается 
света Фаворского. И этот свет проливается к нам, на землю, в 
наши семьи, на наши космодромы, в наши гарнизоны, на наши 
заводы. (Ibid.) 
 
The Russian dream is a temple on a hill. We have built the hill from 
our beliefs, suffering, defeats, from great victories and revelations. On 
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the top of this hill, we have built a temple whose crosses touch heaven 
and the Tabor light. And this light shines on the earth, on our families, 
on our cosmodromes, on our garrisons, on our factories.     
 
Russia is presented as a country of dreamers who are united by 
transgenerational ties: 
 
Мы — мечтатели. Ты, я, родившийся вчера младенец и старик, 
доживающий свою долгую жизнь. Россия — это страна 
мечтателей и героев. 
 
We are the dreamers. You and me, the baby who was born yesterday 
and the old man, who is at the end of his long life. Russia is the country 
of dreamers and heroes.  
 
In this editorial Prokhanov suggests that only those who have a common 
dream can have a future. Russia comes out as a leader because of its alleged 
ability to implement the boldest futuristic dream of its peoples, namely, to 
achieve immortality. Of note is the fact that Prokhanov is prepared to grant 
people of nations such as the USA and China the ability to dream, albeit in 
an inferior way. This can be explained by the fact that his notions of future 
are proleptic and take into account a common historical past. This model of 
assigning significance to the shared past and an affinity of goals is in line 
with the main principles of Neo-Eurasianism. 
 
In this context, Prokhanov’s selection of nations and their dreams has a 
telling void – it excludes European states, nations and their dreams. The 
absence of Europe in this scheme of civilizations is quite conspicuous and as 
such it is a void which must serve a purpose. In terms of the Neo-Eurasianist 
geopolitical doctrine, Western Europe is an Atlanticist civilisation due to its 
colonial expansionism and the de-territorialisation of continental borders. 
The editorial article is a mix of subjective imagination, fiction and political 
discourse, and as such it is a form of literature which relies on deconstruction 
by its readers. It is expected that the reader will fill the void based on his or 
her general knowledge. Readers of the newspaper cannot fail to notice this 
void as Europe/EU today is an important political entity. The void thus 
becomes a device that signifies a hidden meaning. The question which 
Prokhanov invites his readers to ponder on is this: Why is Europe not part of 
his thematization of national dreams? The answer, we propose, lies in a 
carefully chosen strategy: If the narratives of the unifying dream are a 
foundation of a given nation, then the European Union does not fall into this 
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category because it is a young and inorganic entity. Eurasian Russia is 
presented as a homogenous civilization which is founded on identical drives 
and hopes in spite of its multi-ethnic composition.5  (Hence the purpose of 
mentioning diverse nationalities such as formerly animistic, but today mainly 
Orthodox Mari people of the Volga region and Orthodox Ossetians.) The 
United States and China also are the entities which have, according to 
Prokhanov, a common task. They have been integrated historically into 
nations with people who share the same dreams because they were moulded 
by common mythologies. Europe and the EU are fragmented entities when 
it comes to the “dream” reflected in fairy tale motifs and narratives. From 
this follows that the EU/Europe does not have a common dream and 
therefore cannot have a future. Historically the systematic collection of fairy 
tales by folklorists occurred at the time of the rise of the nation state at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. Romantic philologists such as the 
Brothers Grimm collected fairy tales in the Germanic lands, and not in 
“Europe’. Viewed in this context, the EU might be a political entity, but, by 
implication of the Prokhanovian notion of dreaming together, it has no future 
because its people were not brought up on the same dreams. The logic of 
Prokhanov’s reasoning is circular: in order to have a dream one has to be 
brought up on the same dreams. If people do not share the dreams through 
generations, they cannot succeed in the way they think about the future 
because they do not dream together. The implication is that the EU is not 
going to be a major player in the domain of futurity because its mission is 
not based on the firm foundation of the narratives which have homogenous 
beginnings and happy endings.   
 
Mixing Fairy Tales with Geopolitical Doctrines 
 
While Prokhanov’s editorials perform the same function as they did in 
the Soviet press, his style has characteristic features which correspond to new 
developments in the essayistic writing that emerged since the 1980s. 
Prokhanov’s editorials both reflect this development of religious-homiletic 
style and imagery and employ a number of features of the Soviet newspaper 
editorials, one of them being an expectation to refer to a wider political 
context. In this case, the context relates to the geopolitical situation of Russia 
via-à-vis the European Union in all its complexity. Moreover, his implicit 
categorization of fairy tales as underpinned by the unifying role of the 
national state is a manifestation of his authorial subjectivity. Such 
subjectivity was a prescriptive feature of the Soviet editorials which has 
received further developments in current Russian media.  
 
5 On Neo-Eurasianism and futurity in Prokhanov’s fiction see Mondry. 
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By choosing to treat dreams and fairy tales within the notion of the 
nation state Prokhanov adheres to a view of fairy tale motifs which has its 
beginnings in the era of Romanticism with its emphasis on national heritage. 
Importantly, according to this folkloristic paradigm, the phenomenon of 
similar plots in fairy tales and myths among peoples is explained by 
similarities among rodstvennye narody (kinship peoples), stressing their 
common genealogical origins. A later concept of brodiachie siuzhety 
(migratory plots), articulated by Aleksandr Veselovsky (1838-1906), puts an 
emphasis on cross-cultural influences and the mobility of plots. Fittingly, in 
the Stalin era in the post-WW2 period, followers of the Veselovsky school 
of folkloristic thought were criticized for the notion of migratory and 
transnational plots.6  Such theoretical views were regarded as unpatriotic as 
they diminished the notion of exclusivity and specificity of national myths 
(Veselovsky). 
 
Prokhanov’s concept of the specifically national dreams and fairy tale 
motifs conforms to the nationalistically-tinted understanding of fairy tales. 
More importantly, his adherence to the notion of the common plot motifs 
among the rodstvennye narody intersects with the Neo-Eurasianist 
geopolitical ideology. Yet he adjusts the notion of rodstvennye narody by 
excluding other Slavic peoples such as Ukrainians making his void 
politically motivated and recognisable by readers. With Ukraine’s leanings 
towards Euro-Atlantic structures, the current rift between Russia and 
Ukraine clearly has an impact on Prokhanov’s elaborations on the dreams 
about the future.7  It is for this reason that he selectively concentrates on 
ethnic groups situated geographically to the east of Moscow to both reiterate 
and politically modify the foundations of the original Eurasianism. (In 
Trubetskoi’s writing, Ukraine, in spite of the period of colonisation by 
Poland, was viewed as a Eurasian civilisation.) Additionally, Prokhanov’s 
inclusion of dreams of shamans and wisemen intertwines animistic beliefs 
with the Orthodox faith to reflect the fashionable syncretistic religious and 
cultural trends, such as rodnoverie and quasi-New Age movements in vogue 
in Russia today. This syncretistic collage, in turn, echoes the 
phantasmagorical plots of his novels as well as the plots of other fantasy 
 
6 On the history of trends in Russian and Soviet folkloristics see Meletinskii. The 
publication of Meletinsky’s book became possible during the brief period of Thaw in 
the Soviet Union. The second edition came out after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
7 On Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic orientation see Vineta Kleinberga and Elizabete 
Vizgunova in this issue. 
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literature which deal with the resurrection of famous historical personalities, 
including Stalin and even Nikolai Fedorov himself.8   
 
It is important to reiterate that dreaming together is not the only factor 
which guarantees a radiant future for Russia. In line with his notion that the 
Russian people turn Russian fairy tales into reality, Prokhanov maintains that 
political leaders have to be able to implement common dreams into reality. 
In his editorial “Lenin, a Мan of the Sky” (“Lenin – chelovek neba”) ( 22.04. 
2020), dedicated to Lenin’s birthday, Prokhanov calls Lenin a great 
“futurologist” who could not only predict future but also “realise it.”9 
Notably, in fictional genres, such as Soviet science fiction, dreams and the 
future have to turn to reality while realisation and actualisation of dreams 
have to complement the ability to dream collectively (Gomel).  At this 
juncture Prokhanov’s narratives link the pathos of the newspaper editorials 
with the plots of Soviet futurity fiction and current fantasy literature in line 
with the canonical principles of Soviet newspaper writing. In terms of the 
tenets of the genre of the editorials, Prokhanov incorporates all its major 
characteristics. On the one hand, his editorials have a degree of subjectivity 
which renders critical questioning of his revelations superfluous. On the 
other hand, his views about futurity and the achievement of immortality are 
not entirely fictional. To be effective they are grounded in the futuristic 
trends and activities of contemporary Russian society which, according to a 
recent anthropological study, has strong movements and communities who 
work on the achievement of immortality and the extension of life beyond the 
confines of the earth by techno-biological means.10  In this way the emotive-
subjective writing of Prokhanov’s editorials responds to the wider context of 
trends and aspirations of contemporary readers. Notably, his propagandistic 
editorials promote political agendas by advocating the cohesiveness of the 
multi-ethnic empire – “the Fifth Empire”– whose future is construed as 
invincible and eternal because its past and present are fortified by 
homogenous dreams. The political leaders of this Empire are presented as 
great visionary dreamers and futurologists who have the ability to mobilise 
people “to make fairy tales come true”.  
 
8 Viktor Sharov’s novels fall into this category. See an interview with him on “Shkola 
zlosloviia”. On these plots see Mondry 2017.  
 
9 “Ленин был экономист, политик, футуролог, он остро ощущал будущее, он его 
предрекал и потом реализовывал” (Prokhanov 2020). 
 
10 See Bernstein, a recent anthropological study of contemporary futurity groups, 
including followers of Nikolai Fedorov and Cosmists. The study is based on interviews 
and placed in the context of Russian thinking about scientific and religious immortality. 
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These last words – “we were born to make fairy tales come true” which 
come from the song of the Soviet aviators written in the 1920s encapsulate 
the overarching expression of Soviet and post-Soviet national futurity 
advanced by Prokhanov. Read against the backdrop of the newspaper 
editorials, the line from the song embodies both continuity and change 
between the Soviet and post-Soviet propagandistic futurity. The wording of 
the song of the early aviators has a remarkable flexibility which captures 
both the overt and the hidden dimensions of collective dreams’ propaganda 
powers. In the 1920s, this line served as an incarnation of the atheistic 
technocratic dream to fly and to conquer the sky. Notably, the line-slogan 
strongly alluded to the motifs of Russian and Slav fairy tales about the flying 
carpet, “kover-samolet” which, as a form of folk creativity, were interpreted 
as devoid of religious mysticism. Overtly, the conquest of the sky by Soviet 
aviators was positioned to negate religious beliefs in the sky as heaven. Yet, 
paradoxically, the dream of reaching the sky could not be separated from 
religious eschatology, and the atheistic state’s propaganda learned to make 
veiled use of people’s quest for the afterlife. In Prokhanov’s editorials the 
three components – the scientific-technological, national fairy tales and 
trendy post-Soviet syncretistic beliefs - are amalgamated in line with, and by 
means of, this genre as defined by Soviet textbooks and practiced in Soviet 
newspapers. The continuous effective power of these editorials lies in their 
emotively expressed use of the proleptic futurity grounded in the power of 
historical narratives to incite patriotism and nationalism.      
 
Dugin on being, time and eternity 
 
Prokhanov’s figure is now mainstream; the resonance and influence of 
his writings is significant: he is invited to TV talk shows and gets interviewed 
in major media outlets on a regular basis. This is not only due to his 
indisputable literary talent and long-standing reputation as a radical 
journalist. The Neo-Eurasianist ideas that drive his prolific visions are also 
influential and inform the writing of political theorists and even key 
politicians whom they advise. It is hardly surprising, considering that in 
search of a new master ideology that would make sense of Putin-age Russian 
and Soviet history as a continuous line, the latter have been increasingly 
tempted to adopt the Neo-Eurasianist model that largely ignores the political 
nature of successive regimes but instead employs the geopolitical logic of 
particularism. Aleksandr Dugin, the supreme guru of this movement, 
throughout his illustrious career, has been consultant to a wide array of 
politicians, from former Russian State Duma Speakers Gennady Seleznev 
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and Sergey Naryshkin (the latter currently head of SVR, Russia’s Foreign 
Intelligence Service) to LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky. His geopolitical 
theories to this day inform some of the ideological tenets of the regime even 
though the man himself is no longer welcome in mainstream media and 
government offices due to the extremist nature of his ultra-right views. Long-
time friends and associates, Prokhanov and Dugin share roughly the same 
platform, but where Prokhanov works mainly by creative association and 
flights of literary fancy, Dugin, former Chair of Sociology of International 
Relations at Moscow University from which he was banished in 2014 for his 
public call, at the peak of the Donbass war, to “kill, kill, and kill Ukrainians” 
(Dugin 2014) relies on scholarly methods. Dugin’s evolution as a thinker led 
him from membership in the late Soviet chauvinist and anti-Semitic Pamiat’ 
movement to the creation, together with the writer Eduard Limonov and rock 
musician Yegor Letov, of the Nationalist Bolshevik Party, and finally to the 
International Eurasianist Movement.11 His ideas owe as much to Eurasianism 
as they do to the German Conservative Revolution (esp. Karl Haushofer), 
pioneers of geopolitical discourse (esp. Halford Mackinder), European 
National-Bolshevism, the French Nouvelle Droite, as well as to Martin 
Heidegger whom he quotes in just about every treatise. As Andreas Umland 
points out, the term Neo-Eurasianism, in his case, is not entirely accurate 
(Umland 466f). More recently, Dugin rebranded his political philosophy and 
now calls it “the Fourth Political Theory”: it serves as an alternative and a 
counterweight to those three that dominated the 20th century and beyond: 
communism, fascism, and liberalism. In Dugin’s “fourth theory,” the 
original Eurasianist premise discussed above in reference to Prokhanov, 
morphs into the notion that collectivistic and traditionalist land powers, or 
tellurocracies, are poised to fight against individualistic, liberal sea powers, 
or thalassocracies. These two poles are still centred around Eurasia on the 
one hand and the Atlantic on the other, but the geographic principle does not 
necessarily always apply as countries in outlying regions could be co-opted 
by the Eurasianist cause as long as the strict criteria of nationalism and 
traditionalism are adhered to. But what is behind these criteria? 
 
Like Prokhanov, Dugin too often contributes to Zavtra. His style is 
quite different from his older colleague’s, but his contributions also seek to 
furnish the readers with edifying political narratives that, like Prokhanov’s, 
focus on the future, albeit as one would expect, Dugin’s are formulated with 
more scholarly precision. In 2017, Zavtra featured a very revealing 
conversation between Prokhanov and Dugin. In it, Dugin goes to the heart 
 
11 For a comprehensive assessment of Dugin’s evolution as a thinker see Shlapentokh 
2017. 
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of what his “fourth political theory” is all about:  a future defined by a 
specific, axiological understanding of time as infused with eternity. This 
eternity is easily accessed if one follows Dugin’s lead: 
 
Современный либерализм тоталитарен, глобален. И чтобы 
противостоять ему, ни в коем случае нельзя возвращаться ни к 
коммунизму, ни к фашизму, ни даже к их национал-
большевистской помеси, потому что это тот же самый Модерн. 
Четвёртая политическая теория предлагает выйти за пределы 
политического Модерна, за пределы и либерализма, и 
коммунизма, и фашизма, и соединить будущее — 
постсовременность, постмодерн — с традицией, с возвратом к 
традиции, интерпретированной как вечное, а не как прошлое. В 
духе Нового времени мы обычно считаем, что настоящее 
отменяет прошлое. […] То, с чем мы имеем дело, — это время, 
отпавшее от своей оси. Возвращение к оси, по образу и подобию 
которой время и создано, есть задача Четвёртой политической 
теории. На этом основании строится проект будущего, который 
воплощается в теорию многополярного мира, поскольку каждый 
народ в ней являет главную ценность. Народ становится 
носителем той вечности, о которой идёт речь, поэтому пробиться 
к ней, минуя народ, невозможно. Универсализм здесь очень 
тонкий. Соединение всего происходит через углубление каждого 
народа в своё частное. 
 
Contemporary liberalism is totalitarian and global. And in order to 
resist it, one should by no means go back either to communism, 
fascism, or even their national-Bolshevik cross because it is still 
modernity. The fourth political theory offers us the opportunity to step 
beyond political modernity, beyond liberalism, communism, and 
fascism and to connect the future—postmodernity, the postmodern—
with tradition, a return to tradition interpreted as eternity, not as the 
past. In the spirit of Modernity, we generally hold that the present 
cancels out the past […] What we are dealing with here is time that 
has fallen off its axis. To return to this axis in whose image time has 
been created is the task of the Fourth political theory. The project of 
the future is built upon this foundation—it is embodied in the theory 
of a multipolar world because in it, every nation manifests its own 
supreme value. The nation becomes а carrier of the eternity we are 
talking about here; therefore, it is impossible to get through to it 
bypassing the nation. The universalism here is very subtle. Everything 
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is bound together through an immersion of every nation into its own 
particularity. (Prokhanov, Dugin 2017) 
 
This vision is clearly eschatological as it anticipates the end of time and the 
Second Coming when time is no more. In V poiskakh temnogo Logosa (In 
Search of the Dark Logos), a volume of essays published in 2013, Dugin 
offers an erudite excursion into Greek philosophy, early Orthodox theology 
as well as the work of Martin Heidegger all of which are used to support his 
geopolitical doctrine. Pointing to Heidegger’s location of the possibility of 
authentic Dasein in the temporality of the future, Dugin explains that it is 
only by a decisive “switching of one’s regime of existence towards Er-eignis 
[singular event]” that one can be saved by the eventuation of “the Truth of 
Being.” (Dugin 2013 347). This, to Dugin, is not just a philosophical premise 
but rather a call for political action that neatly fits into his political-religious 
construct. It is by transitioning to the latter that the Truth of Being can be 
entered as the authentic future. What is this construct? In essence, Dugin 
champions the pre-Petrine and pre-Schism political order based on the 
Byzantine paradigm. In his view, Ivan the Terrible is the model, 
quintessential ruler, “the figure of the tsar philosopher, an eschatological 
analogy of the first Christian emperor Constantine setting the church and 
political order in his kingdom as the execution of God’s will” (Dugin 2013 
37). More recently, Dugin has consistently asserted Russia’s role as the 
katechon, that which holds the Antichrist at bay as per 2 Thessalonians 2.5-
7: “And you know what is now restraining him, so that he may be revealed 
when his time comes.” In Dugin’s 2018 “Theses on the Antichrist” published 
in his videoblog on the zavtra.ru website, he asserts that “the Orthodox Tsar 
is he who stands at the last stronghold, before the Antichrist. And when he 
falls, and a hole opens up in Being, the Antichrist comes” (Dugin 2018). 
Predictably, when in the 2017 conversation we just cited, Prokhanov who, 
as we have seen, is fond of the “city” metaphor, asks Dugin to “fantasise” 
about a city built according to his own views, Dugin paints the following 
picture: 
 
Он, во-первых, должен быть концентричен. Если мы сейчас 
предложим этот город, мы придём к Москве дораскольного 
периода. В центре находится ось — воплощение самой вечности 
в человеческом мире. Царь и патриарх, духовное и земное, 
связанное воедино. Этот город строится вокруг своего центра. 
Центр является священным. В нём находится дворец и храм. Два 
уровня вечности: вечности небесной, которая воплощена в 
патриархе, в церкви, и вечности земной, недвижимым двигателем 
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которой является царь. Соответственно, вокруг него эта вечность 
расходится лучами, как солнце нисходит по вертикали. […]  
 
First of all, it must be concentric. If we offer [a vision] of this city 
now, we will come to the Moscow of the pre-Schism period. At its 
centre, there will be an axis: the embodiment of eternity itself in the 
human world. The tsar and the patriarch, the earthly and the spiritual, 
bound together. This city is built around its centre. The centre is 
sacred. In it, we have the palace and the temple. There are two levels 
of eternity: heavenly eternity embodied in the patriarch and earthly 
eternity whose immoveable mover is the tsar. This eternity radiates 
from him same as the sun descends in a vertical. (Prokhanov, Dugin 
2017) 
 
This picture is consistent with Dugin’s adherence to the Byzantine notion of 
a symphony of the secular and ecclesiastical powers which in Muscovy was 
presumably in place from Ivan III to the Time of Trouble and subsequently 
in the 17th century, during the rule of the first Romanovs until Nikon ended 
it with the Schism of the Church. Dugin’s model does not envisage more 
than three classes or castes (sosloviia) in this society: below the symphony 
of the philosopher tsar and the Church patriarch, stand philosopher priests, 
noble warriors, and, finally, labourers on the land: “Так мы приходим к 
идеалу Святой Руси. Есть Святая Русь — перемещаем в XXI век. 
Другие материалы, но вечные формы.”  (Prokhanov, Dugin 2017) (“Thus 
we come to the ideal of Holy Rus. There is Holy Rus—we move it into the 
21st century.”) Dugin’s authentic zavtra is neo-medieval: it is both archaic 
and post-modern in that it steps over hated modernity with its utopia of 
liberal democracy. This said, his understanding of modernity is peculiar: he 
does not cast away the Soviet experience—not in its entirety anyhow—
because, as he asserts in his 2012 textbook Geopolitika sovremennoi Rossii 
[Geopolitics of Contemporary Russia], Stalin’s USSR, despite its atheist and 
internationalist ideology, was nonetheless “a new edition of the Russian 
land-based tsardom, while Stalin was a ‘red tsar’” (Dugin 2012 327). In this 
scheme, Moscow as the15th-century Third Rome becomes, post 1917, home 
to the Third International, “a geopolitical instrument of spreading Russia’s 
tellurocratic, land-based influence” (ibid., original emphasis). Thus, the 
Christian messianism of the Muscovite Tsardom is equally reflected in the 
messianism of the world revolution centred in Moscow, particularly after the 
arrival of Stalin’s 1925 “socialism in one country” doctrine which makes the 
Soviet capital the centre of messianic gravity, a different kind of katechon. 
Given Stalin’s fascination with Ivan the Terrible, this parallel is rather self-
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evident, and, much like Prokhanov, Dugin is clearly inclined to incorporate 
Stalin both into his geopolitical and eschatological construct of Holy Rus, 
despite Stalin’s dogmatic Marxism, an obvious product of modernity and an 
offshoot of the European Enlightenment project. This, no doubt, is due to the 
fact that Stalin, Dugin’s red monarch, somehow re-established, if 
unconsciously, the umbilical link to the authentic Dasein of eternity which 
after his death is lost again. 
 
Importantly, although Holy Rus in Dugin’s scheme, is the katechon, 
other Indo-European nations that set themselves up according to his vision 
will be welcome in his empire. This empire stretching “from Dublin to 
Vladivostok” will embrace them if they share this vision and agree to be part 
of it on Dugin’s terms. The terms stipulate, for example, that while most 
nations should retain their particularity, some other ones have no claim to it 
whatsoever. Thus Ukrainians (with the exception of those living in the far 
West of the country to whom Dugin allows some form of nationhood) must 
realise that they are actually Russian. This is precisely what he asserts in his 
intimate “geopolitical diary” Ukraina: moia voina (Ukraine: My War) 
(2015) whose title, genre, and the overall preoccupation with the geopolitics 
of the future allude in no uncertain way to Hitler’s Mein Kampf (even as 
Dugin’s book condemns the Ukrainian “junta” as a quintessentially Nazi 
project). Ukraine as a nation state within its current borders, in his view, is 
nothing but a pernicious utopia spun by the Western liberals: 
  
Большая Украина – это чушь, несбыточная, злобная, мелкая, 
завистливая и кривая, основанная на ressentiment в качестве 
национальной идеи. А вот Великая Россия не чушь. Это было, и 
это будет. Наши земли сужаются, а затем – как пружина – 
расширяются. И так всегда. Это бьется русское сердце. В 1991 
году мы снова сжались. С Осетии, Абхазии и особенно с Крыма 
и Новороссии начался обратный отсчет – время Империи. 
Многие хотят нас сдержать, но не удастся. Мы строим вообще 
другое общество, другое Государство, чем то, которое есть 
сейчас. От нынешнего переходного состояния не останется камня 
на камне, как не осталось камня на камне от Российской империи, 
а затем от СССР. И мы идем не назад, но вперед. Вечность не 
прошлое, она всегда еще и настоящее и, главное, будущее. 
Вечность вообще впереди. Это и есть самый настоящий авангард. 
Индоевропейская Священная Империя Конца – вот наше 
истинное будущее. (Dugin 2015 485). 
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Greater Ukraine is nonsense: unrealisable, evil, petty, envious and 
crooked, based on ressentiment as its national idea. Great Russia, 
however, is no nonsense. It has been, and it will be. Our lands shrink 
and then, like a spring, they expand. This has always been so. This is 
the Russian heart beating. In 1991, we shrank again. A reverse 
countdown began with Ossetia, Abkhazia, and especially with Crimea 
and Novorossiya: the time of Empire. Many want to restrain us, but 
they won’t succeed. We are building a completely different kind of 
society, a different kind of State from the one we have now. No stone 
will remain from today’s transitional state as no stone was left from 
the Russian Empire and then the USSR. We are going forwards, not 
backwards. Eternity is not the past, it is always the present, and most 
importantly, the future. Eternity is ahead. It is the very real avant-
garde. The Holy Indo-European Empire of the End: this is our true 
future.  
 
Dugin’s vision of the future has no alternatives: as someone who believes he 
can access eternity, the axis of time, he clearly considers himself in 
possession of the knowledge of what is to come, even if this future may be 
deferred. Dugin’s 2014 diary ends on the note of bitter disappointment as 
Russia, despite starting the war in Donbass, setting up and supporting the 
separatist “republics,” fails to move to a direct annexation of “Novorossiya” 
with its own troops and instead settles for a stalemate, signing the Minsk 
agreements, while he himself gets fired from his position at Moscow 
University for inciting hatred and murder. This failure, according to him, is 
due to the efforts of the liberal fifth column within the Russian society as 
well as what he calls “the sixth column,” the oligarchs who only look after 
their own purses. Of all the Kremlin officials whom he castigates throughout 
the book, the most blame goes to Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s erstwhile 
ideologist and in 2014, the person directly in charge of the Kremlin’s 
Ukrainian diplomatic and military front. Surkov, too, has visions of the 
future inspired by Neo-Eurasianists.  
 
Surkov, the “deep people” and Putin’s “long state” 
 
In February of 2019, Surkov, at this point a presumed private citizen as 
he had resigned from his official position as Putin's advisor for the CIS 
countries, caused quite a stir in the Russian media, both conventional and 
social, with an article entitled “Putin’s Long State” in which he made a few 
bold pronouncements about the future of the regime, its place in the country’s 
history and its fundamental difference from Western democracies. Overall, 
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this article is far from spectacular, and it would have passed unnoticed had it 
not been written by the author of the “sovereign democracy” concept coined 
in the mid-2000s as the main slogan of Putin’s 2007-2008 election campaign. 
In “Putin’s Long State,” Surkov starts out by discarding the very notion of 
democracy altogether as so much illusion. “The illusion of choice,” he 
argues, “is the most important of all illusions, the trademark trick of the 
Western way of life overall, and of the Western democracy, in particular. 
[…] A rejection of this illusion in favour of realistically acknowledging what 
is predetermined has led our society first to contemplate its own, special, 
sovereign version of democratic development, and then to a complete loss of 
interest in discussions on what democracy should be like and whether it 
should exist at all” (Surkov 2019)  
 
What we have in Russia, instead, is a state that does not need this 
imported “chimera” but is guided by the logic of historical processes. This 
country, whose place in history, is “far from modest,” went through a period 
of disintegration and then “returned to its natural and solely possible state of 
a great power” – a great power that increases in size, gathering communities 
of nations. This state, gathering lands, like Muscovy in the 14th-15th 
century, is of course Putin’s Russia, an “organically shaped model” of 
Russia’s “survival and elevation” for the coming years and decades until the 
end of this century. Surkov’s horizons of futurity are modest. His historical 
horizon, however, are rather less so. Echoing the 15th-century slogan of 
Moscow the Third Rome, he proposes a fourth. According to him, Putin’s 
Russia is the fourth model of statehood in the country’s history: it sits next 
to Lenin’s USSR which in turn is preceded by the Russian Empire of Peter 
the Great and the Grand Principality of Muscovy of Ivan III. Yeltsin is 
conspicuously absent from this list, as the founder of post-Soviet Russia and 
Putin’s anointer.  Even more noteworthy is the fact that neither Ivan the 
Terrible, nor Stalin are mentioned as the current president’s political 
antecedents but are simply subsumed under the Muscovite and Soviet 
models. It is, however, quite clear that the main national idea articulated in 
Surkov’s article is that of “land gathering” and military expansion.  
 
“These political machines replaced one another, got fixed up and 
adapted along the way, ensuring the Russian world’s consistent upward 
movement, century after century.” Their creators, were, according to Surkov, 
what Lev Gumilev calls “people of long will.” Gumilev’s figure is very 
significant in the context of Surkov’s ideological proposition: Gumilev first 
applied the term “people of long will” to the “passionary” Mongols who 
eventually co-opted their neighbours to conquer the boundless steppes and 
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thus ensured their own survival. Thus, the ideology of Eurasianism that 
propounds Russia’s middle path of development, distinct from both Western 
and Eastern, is a clear subtext to Surkov’s vision and is so signalled, just as 
it is the foundation of Prokhanov’s and Dugin’s views. At the same time, 
Surkov’s article also contains echoes not of Peter the Great’s Roman, 
secular, and Westernised vision of a Russian Empire, but rather of the 
Russian empire of Nicholas I, the police state of the gendarme of Europe 
reigning under the aegis of Count Uvarov’s official nationality doctrine, with 
Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality guiding the way forward. There is no 
conspicuous Orthodoxy in Surkov’s opus, because his too is ostensibly a 
secular, and presumably religiously inclusive vision, but it is a vision that 
resolutely refuses to import any Western notions, and also one in which the 
very idea of Russia’s uniqueness replaces (or implicitly incorporates) the 
religious component. Without this component, however, the uniqueness 
rings rather hollow as there is no divine “eternity” from which his model 
could be suspended. 
 
Autocracy and nationality (narodnost’) feature very prominently in the 
article, and again Surkov’s versions of these two concepts are presented in 
counterpoint to the Western notion of the democratic state. Just as Peter the 
Great, on his visit to England, rejected the idea of parliament as nonsense for 
a country like Russia and just as Lenin, in The State and the Revolution, 
rejected the idea of multi-party democracy as bourgeois veneer that hides 
and protects the exploitation of the masses, Surkov unmasks Western 
democracy to expose what in Turkish is known as derin devlet or the deep 
state. This term, explains Surkov, “signifies a hard, totally undemocratic 
network of real power structures concealed under the window dressing of 
democratic institutions. […] It is a mechanism hidden deep under the surface 
of the civil society that in practice operates through violence, corruption and 
manipulation.” This kind of exposure of Western democracies is of course 
nothing new and forms the core agenda of the Russian media, broadcasting 
both domestically and to foreign audiences. What is new, however, is that in 
Surkov’s manifesto, the Western deep state is countered with the Russian 
one—a state that while certainly not quite as pretty, is far more honest. It has 
no need for Western hypocrisies because it has no need to hide its power 
structures, no need to drape the truth with illusions: “The high inner tension 
associated with maintaining control of vast non-homogenous spaces and the 
constant participation in the thick of geopolitical struggle make the military-
police functions of the state most important and the decisive.” The honest 
Russian state has no need to conceal its necessarily brutal police and military 
functions; furthermore, they must be displayed for everyone to see.   
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Instead of the deep state, Russia has “a deep people” (глубинный 
народ). What is this people? No definition is given, and the description is 
more than vague. 
 
Глубинный народ всегда себе на уме, недосягаемый для 
социологических опросов, агитации, угроз и других способов 
прямого изучения и воздействия […] Своей гигантской 
супермассой глубокий народ создает непреодолимую силу 
культурной гравитации, которая соединяет нацию и притягивает 
(придавливает) к земле (к родной земле) элиту, время от времени 
пытающуюся космополитически воспарить. 
 
The deep people always has its own idea of what is going on, is 
inaccessible to sociological surveys, threats, indoctrination, and other 
methods of direct impact […] With its giant supermass, the people 
creates an insurmountable power of cultural gravitation that binds the 
nation and pushes (presses) down to earth (the native soil) the elite 
which from time to time attempts to hover up in a cosmopolitan flight. 
 
One finds out its true feelings and desires always too late. This inner 
narod is truly mysterious in that it does not fully coincide with the 
population. There is no point idealising its sections which is what at various 
points in time did Russian populists, Slavophiles, and Bolsheviks.  
 
Surkov’s new understanding of narodnost’ is then immediately linked 
with Putin’s “long state.” This state is unique in that it can actually hear and 
understand the people, the narod, “see through it,” and act accordingly. The 
Russian model is based in trust. The deep people can only trust the leader, 
“первое лицо.” This is not the naïve faith in the good tsar as exhibited by 
the Russian peasants for centuries (even though it has its roots in this faith). 
The deep people is not naïve, and the trust it has in the leader is based on 
understanding, cooperation, and effective communication exercised through 
various institutions of the state as well as informally. Thus, instead of the 
Western oppositional model based in accountability of the leader and 
consequently inherent mistrust, the Russian one is open, honest and based in 
utter trust. And because of this trust, Putin’s state is a long one, its principles 
will outlive Putin himself and will continue long afterwards, akin to the 
Gaullist state in France or even the state of the founding fathers in the US.  
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While Dugin’s nation is a bearer of eternity, Surkov’s model of futurity, 
as we have seen, lacks this essentialist religious axis or Prokhanov’s 
essentialist national dreams. Surkov’s vision is, on the one hand, hollow and 
bland and, on the other hand, no less fanciful and fairy-tale-like. Instead of 
the Christian eternity beyond our fallen time or dreams that drive nations’ 
development through socio-economic formations, Surkov proclaims the 
implied eternity of Putin and his regime—supported by nothing, except some 
dark magic of “the deep people” about which we know nothing and never 
will. In 2020, the current Speaker of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin, 
put it in even plainer language when asked whether the Constitutional 
amendments adopted at Putin’s suggestion that year were introduced in order 
to create a system that will come after Putin: “Why, after Putin, there’ll be 
Putin!” (Volodin 2020). Surkov and Volodin thus openly suggest that 
Putinism is larger than Putin the man and will outlive him. Surkov’s article 
did not get an official response from the Kremlin (apart from a lukewarm 
nod from Putin’s press-secretary Peskov), but just about every pro-Putin 
commentator praised the article as an important discussion document, while 
most liberal commentators predictably ridiculed it. Dugin and Prokhanov, 
too, were asked what they thought. Prokhanov, in an interview with the 
Kremlin’s top propagandist Vladimir Solovyov, said that while Surkov was 
right to name the deep people as the nucleus of Russian history, he failed to 
identify “its content” which, in Prokhanov’s view, is “the dream of a strong, 
benevolent state, a kingdom that defends the meek, the poor […], often the 
dream of the kingdom of heaven” (Prokhanov 2019). This dream that, as we 
know, according to Prokhanov, was cherished by the deep people throughout 
both the imperial and the communist era is something Surkov “is afraid to 
talk about” (ibid.). 
 
Dugin went further in his criticism. While stating many logical and 
legitimate facts, Surkov, in Dugin’s opinion, spoke for the country’s entire 
elite which desperately wants for Putin’s status quo to last forever. Such 
pronouncements, says Dugin, are usually made just before a state, on the eve 
of its collapse, loses touch with reality. This is akin to hypnotising people to 
believe that everything will stay as it is in the present. Putin, for his part, 
although a hero, has exhausted his potential, and the future is not his.  
 
Путин сделал огромный вклад в развитие России, его заслуги 
нельзя ставить под сомнение. Это спаситель и герой нашей страны. 
В этом отношении я считаю, что его миссия выполнена. Путин 
полностью исчерпал все, что он мог сделать хорошего. […] 
Соответственно, Путину полностью принадлежит настоящее и 
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совершенно не принадлежит будущее. В будущем потребуется 
полное изменение и пересмотр всех параметров сложившейся в 
России системы. (Dugin 2019) 
 
Putin has made a tremendous contribution to the development of 
Russia; his achievements are beyond any doubt. He is the saviour and 
hero of our country. In this regard, I think that his mission is 
accomplished. Putin has completely exhausted everything good that he 
could do. […] Thus, the present fully belongs to him, but the future does 
not belong to him at all. The future will require a complete overhaul of 
all the parameters of the system that has taken shape in Russia.  
 
Surkov may have borrowed some key notions from the Neo-Eurasianist 
discourse that drives the ideas of Prokhanov and Dugin, but his future is 
indeed far from “passionary.” Just as the secular dreams of the Americans or 
the Chinese in Prokhanov’s editorial, Surkov’s future is devoid of 
eschatology, aspirations towards eternity, or dreams of immortality. Emptied 
out of that content, it is indeed a suspended present, with nothing but Putin’s 
person to prop it up. 
 
Conclusion: eschatology, nationalism, and geopolitics 
 
 It is quite apparent that Putin’s propaganda machine has hit a wall after 
the initial wave of post-Crimea euphoria subsided. The narrative of the 
Russian people rising up from its knees following years of post-Soviet 
humiliation clearly had a limited shelf life, with an ideological void at the 
core of the Putin regime urgently requiring new concepts in order to shape a 
vision of the future that would logically stem from a narrative of the past. 
Neo-Eurasianist discourse provides a very tempting model to follow. In our 
case studies of Aleksandr Prokhanov’s editorials and Aleksandr Dugin’s we 
have demonstrated that the future proposed by these utopian ultra-right 
figures is based on eschatological notions rooted in the Russia’s pre-Petrine 
past and in folklore. Proleptic or analeptic, their future is neo-medieval and 
not entirely compatible with the reactionary yet secular nature of the Putin 
regime. Vyacheslav Surkov’s desperate attempt at adapting the Neo-
Eurasianist narrative to the geopolitical requirements of the Kremlin is, 
however, devoid of any emotive appeal and is an apt reflection of the 
stagnant state of Putin’s regime whose increasing draconian qualities make 
its future prospects ever so much dimmer.  
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